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Abstract
This paper studies diﬀerent housing market arrangements in an intertemporal
pure consumption economy, consisting of a desirable and an undesirable housing
location. Economic agents are heterogenous with respect to the utility premium
they derive from living in the desirable location. This utility premium, or match, is
drawn independently in every period, and also the popularity ranking of the loca-
tions may be reversed between periods. Under owner-occupation, the opportunity
cost of living in a desirable location takes the form of random capital losses, and for-
gone capital gains. The rental arrangement corresponds to owner-occupation, with
capital gains and losses taking place with probability one. We show that under
the rental arrangement the agents have strong incentives to choose their location
according to the current match, while under owner-occupation these incentives are
weaker, and borrowing constraints play a larger role in clearing the housing market.
We demonstrate that there is more residential mobility under rental markets than
under owner-occupied housing. According to a utilitarian social welfare criterion,
the rental arrangement outperforms owner-occupation.
Keywords: Household mobility, Liquidity constraints, Owner-occupation, Rental hous-
ing.
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1 Introduction
This paper is a theoretical investigation into the relative merits of diﬀerent housing
arrangements in allocating people in space and in time. Our starting point is the double
nature of houses as both consumption goods and assets. Under the rental arrangement
these two functions are separated, and for a tenant a house is definitely a consumption
good which is bought in every period for the services it oﬀers. At each moment of time
there is also an intimate connection between benefits received and costs incurred: people
residing in a desirable area pay for the privilege in the form of higher rents. The rental
market thus oﬀers people strong incentives to choose their location based on current
benefits, or the current match.
By contrast, when bought, a house not only entitles its owner to a stream of services,
but it is also an asset which may either appreciate or depreciate in value. Then at least
a part of the costs for living in a currently desirable area consists of capital losses which
are incurred by those who happen to own a house there when prices fall. Likewise the
compensation for those settling for a currently unpopular area partially takes the form of
random capital gains.
This paper suggests, that the randomness introduced by the asset aspect of owner-
occupied housing loosens the link between services received and payments made, and
the incentives to choose one’s location in every period based on the goodness of match
are weaker than under the rental arrangement. In particular we find that the uncertain
punishment embodied in capital losses does not provide a strong enough deterrent for
wealthy agents to move out of the desirable location when their match is poor. Then,
a part of the mechanism equating housing supply and demand assumes a diﬀerent form:
some of those agents who are hit by a negative shock become liquidity constrained, and
thus cannot buy a house in a desirable area even when their match is good.
We try to convey these ideas in the simplest possible framework. We consider an
infinite horizon pure consumption economy, consisting of two locations. Both locations
have a fixed stock of houses. In each period one of the locations is desirable while the
other one is (relatively) undesirable. When living in the desirable area, an agent receives
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a higher instantaneous utility stream, reflecting e.g. a better quality of environmental
amenities and other public goods, a greater variety of services or well-paid jobs, safety
and various socio-economic aspects of the neighborhood. The agents are heterogenous
with respect to the utility premium they derive from residing in the desirable location, or
in the quality of their ’match’. The match may also change over time. This may reflect
changes in the socio-economic status of the agent (or the household), such as having
children, finishing studies and entering the labor market, or retiring. The match may
also improve or deteriorate as a result of alterations taking place in the neighborhood.
For example, new bars and restaurants typically render an area more appealing for some
people, while less appealing for others.
It is also possible that the overall ranking of the locations is reversed. A polluting
factory or a prison tends to render a location less popular, while, say, a new school or
improving public transport is likely to enhance its appeal. The changing attractiveness of
diﬀerent areas may also follow from labor market conditions, or from fads and fashions.
When a location becomes (relatively) more or less appealing for the population as a whole,
also relative housing prices in diﬀerent regions change. This gives rise to capital gains
and losses.
In the economy, financial and insurance markets are incomplete in two ways. First,
we stipulate that idiosyncratic shocks (i.e. draws of the match) are uninsurable. This
assumption is rather natural, since a putative insurer cannot (perfectly) observe an agent’s
match, and if asked, the agent typically faces incentives to misreport his type.1 Second,
we also assume that housing price movements are uninsurable. Although there have been
a few real-life experiments with housing price index based financial instruments2 in the
U.S. and in the U.K., this assumption still seems to be broadly consistent with empirical
evidence.
We then analyze the economy under owner-occupation and rental housing. Under
1Rather obviously, idealized insurance markets which cover the greater housing costs of agents with the
best current match are not feasible. However, most probably, there are incentive compatible mechanisms,
which are more elaborate and more eﬃcient than the simple incomplete market outcome analyzed in this
paper.
2These instruments are often called Case Shiller securities. For a discussion, see e.g. Shiller (1993).
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owner-occupation the opportunity cost of living in a currently desirable location consists
of stochastic capital losses and forgone capital gains. Our analysis shows, that the rental
arrangement corresponds to a special case of owner-occupation, with both costs and ben-
efits accruing with probability one. An agent incurring a capital loss, or making a gain,
moves up or down the wealth ladder. At the lowest allowed step he is liquidity constrained
and cannot aﬀord a house in the desirable location.
We show that the higher the probability of changes in relative housing prices, the more
inclined an agent with a given wealth is to choose the unpopular neighborhood when his
match is poor. Also, the shape of the wealth distribution depends on the frequency of
regional shocks. In particular, the liquidity constrained group is smaller, when transitions
up and down the wealth ladder happen with a larger probability. Combining individual
agents’ decision rules at diﬀerent wealth levels and the wealth distribution, we can then
assess the aggregate functioning of the economy. We find that, according to a standard
utilitarian welfare criterion, the owner-occupied arrangement functions better in turbulent
times, with frequent capital gains and losses, than in tranquil times. Also residential mo-
bility increases together with the frequency of shocks. Moreover, the rental arrangement
outperforms owner-occupation in encouraging residential mobility, and results in higher
social welfare.
The double role of housing as a consumption good and an asset has been recognized at
least since Henderson and Ioannides (1983) who studied its implications for tenure choice.
The basic problem arises from the fact that a household’s consumption demand for hous-
ing may constrain its investment choice for housing, or vice versa. A subsequent paper
by Henderson and Ioannides (1987) considered a model with more general institutional
characteristics and then analyzed it empirically. Bruenecker (1997) further studied the
interaction between the consumption demand and the investment demand for housing in
a mean-variance portfolio context, while Flavin and Yamashita (2002) undertook a corre-
sponding econometric analysis. Recent literature has also recognized that owner-occupied
housing may serve as a hedge against the risk that house prices rise in the future (see
Cocco (2000), Davidoﬀ (2003), Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002b), and Sinai and Souleles
5
(2003))3. However, none of these papers has considered the implications of housing market
capital losses and gains for regional allocation of economic agents. The only paper towards
this direction we found is by Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002a) who studied household mo-
bility, volatility of house prices and income distribution.4 While they demonstrated in a
stochastic two-location, two-period model that home-ownership enables more households
to remain in the more desirable location at the expense of newcomers, their analysis does
not consider the possibility of capital losses in the housing market. Also, their analysis
(like the other aforementioned ones) is merely partial equilibrium in nature, while the
present paper is concerned with a general equilibrium outcome. More importantly, we
take up the question of aggregate welfare instead of an individual’s optimization problem
that is the common perspective in the bulk of the previous contributions.
The liquidity constraint theme of this paper is closely related to that of Stein (1994)
who studied the eﬀects of a down-payment on the formation of house price movements.
Whereas Stein considered a static economy with an exogenous debt distribution, we ana-
lyze a dynamic model and derive an endogenously arising wealth distribution across the
agents. It is also worth mentioning that in the economy of this paper agents can become
mismatched due to similar reasons as in the recent searching models for housing markets
by Wheaton (1990) and Williams (1995).
On the empirical front, a series of studies have examined whether owner-occupiers are
more unemployed and less mobile than those who rent their homes. The most cited paper
is by Oswald (1997) who observed from OECD data that the rate of owner-occupied
housing is positively correlated with the average rate of unemployment (for additional
evidence see e.g. Green and Hendershott (2001) and Nickell and Layard (1999)). Also
various microeconomic studies have indicated that home-owners are more sluggish to
move in response to changing labor market conditions than people who rent their homes
(see e.g. Barceló (2003), Cameron and Muellbauer (2001), Hughes and McCormick (1985,
3These papers also analyze the role of the home as a hedging device against adverse shocks in good
prices or labor income. In fact, Henderson and Ioannides (1983) already considered homeownership as a
means to ensure desired housing consumption when future house prices are uncertain.
4Also Rady and Ortalo-Magné (1999, 2001) are somewhat related and provide explanations for why
house prices tend to be very volatile - an important factor in the present theory.
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1987), Henley (1998), and Gardner et al. (2000)). While none of the theoretical arguments
presented in these studies give well founded role for capital losses and gains in the housing
market, the empirical content is broadly consistent with the theoretical findings of the
present paper. Thus, our paper takes a step towards better understanding of this large
body of empirical evidence and perhaps also oﬀers a route to discovering new hypotheses
for empirical examination.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays down the model basics. Section
3 shows how an agent’s wealth evolves under diﬀerent housing arrangements. It turns
out that the wealth accumulation of an agent in the rental market can be represented as
special case of the one of the owner-occupied housing arrangement. In Section 4, we solve
the agents’ optimal moving policy that depends on their wealth. Section 5 proceeds from
the individual to the aggregate level and derives the aggregate wealth distribution of the
economy. Sections 6 provides mobility and welfare comparisons between the two housing
market arrangements. In section 7 we summarize our findings, discuss their generality
and how we have examined their robustness in some of our related studies.
2 The basics of the economy
The economy has two locations, or neighborhoods. Both locations have an equal, fixed,
stock of identical houses. Each house is occupied by a single economic agent and no one
agent is ever homeless. For convenience, assume that in each location the stock of houses
and the mass of agents each comprises a continuum of size unity.
There are infinite discrete time periods indexed by t = 0, 1, .... In each period, one
of the locations is deemed more desirable than the other. When a period changes, the
ranking of the locations is reversed with probability π ∈ [0, 1].
The agents are heterogenous in the quality of their match, or type. In every period
the match θ of each agent is randomly drawn from a cumulative distribution function
G(θ), on some support [θL, θH ], where 0 < θL < θH < ∞. The aggregate heterogeneity
of agents is unchanged over time so that G is stationary. The actual utility of an agent
is conditional on the neighborhood where he resides. We assume that an agent receives
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utility θ, the value of his type, when living in the desirable location. For simplicity, the
utility of anyone agent living in the less desirable location is normalized to zero. Finally,
the agents live forever and discount future utilities by a common factor β ∈ (0, 1).
The sequence of events in any time period is the following. First, a random process
determines which location is desirable and which is not. Second, each agent observes his
current type θ, which is drawn from the distributionG(θ). Finally the agents decide where
they want to live. Depending on their choice, they either stay where they are or they
migrate to the other location. However, if the agent is liquidity constrained, he cannot
move from an undesirable location to a desirable location. Liquidity constraints will be
discussed in the next section.
Denote the median type by θm. In every period, the aggregate welfare is maximized,
if all agents with θ > θm are allocated to the desirable location, those with θ < θm live
in less desirable location, and the group (always of measure zero, if G is continuous) with
θ = θm is divided between the locations so that capacity constraints in housing are not
violated. If this allocation rule is followed, the expected utility of a representative agent
in any period is
W ∗ = 1
2
E[θ | θ ≥ θm] =
Z θH
θm
θdG(θ) (1)
To implement the first best outcome, half of the agents who are in the desirable location at
the beginning of a period must move to the undesirable location, while the same amount
of agents must make the journey in the opposite direction. Thus the measure of aggregate
mobility needed in any period is
M∗ = 1
3 Housing arrangement and the evolution of wealth
While in the social optimum the place where an agent lives should only depend on his
type, in the market outcome the choice is also influenced by wealth. In particular an
agent’s moving decisions may be radically restricted by the liquidity constraint. This
section studies how an agent’s wealth evolves under diﬀerent housing arrangements.
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We begin by owner-occupied housing. Let pg and pb, respectively, denote the market
prices of the houses in the desirable and undesirable (or good and bad) neighborhoods.
These steady state prices satisfy the inequality pg > pb. A move from the good neigh-
borhood to the bad neighborhood by an agent entails that he sells his current house in
the good location and buys another home in the less desirable location. The diﬀerence in
house prices p = pg − pb is then deposited to the agent’s bank account. In the opposite
case, an agent moving from the less desirable neighborhood to more desirable location
withdraws p units from his account to make up for the diﬀerence between house prices.
For a move from the bad to the good location to be possible, the agent’s bank balance
has to be large enough to cover the costs. To be more specific we assume that there is
a maximum level of debt which cannot be exceeded. If this requirement is not met, the
agent is liquidity constrained and cannot move. To keep the model as simple as possible
we assume that the bank is just a clearinghouse which keeps track of agents’ balances. In
particular, the bank does not pay any interest to the deposits. An alternative interpreta-
tion of the financial institutions is that money is the only store of value in the economy.5
Note that the savings or money holdings of an agent then always comprise a multiple of
p.
Take two agents i and j. At the beginning of a period agent i has n×p units of wealth
in his bank account and a house in the undesirable location, while agent j has (n− 1)× p
units in the bank and a house in the desirable location. Now it should be fairly easy to
see that there is no real diﬀerence between the two agents’ financial position. As housing
markets are assumed to be frictionless i can sell his house in the bad neighborhood and
buy another in the good neighborhood. After this transaction he has exactly the same
assets as j. The same argument also applies the other way round. We can then define a
wealth class consisting of two financial states:
Wealth class n :



(n− 1)× p units in bank and a house in the good location
n× p units in bank and a house in the bad location.
(2)
5Section 7 provides some discussion on structure of asset markets.
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Figure 1: Wealth class, bank savings, and house location
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This classification system simply captures that fact that to assess an agent’s aggregate
wealth, we must add together the value of his house and his bank savings. Agents be-
longing to the same wealth class have the same amount of aggregate assets.
A case with five wealth classes, ranging from 0 to 4, is illustrated in Figure 1. Bank
savings of people living in the desirable and the undesirable location are measured on
the two horizontal axes. As a convenient normalization, we denote the lowest permitted
bank balance by 0.Wealth classes 1, 2, and 3, delimited by ellipsoids, each consist of two
financial states, in accordance with the definition (2) given above. In the lowest wealth
class 0, the agents are liquidity constrained and cannot move to the good neighborhood.
Thus this wealth class is a singleton. Also the highest wealth class, in our example class
4, contains only one financial state. Agents belonging to this class are so wealthy that
they never want to move to the less desirable neighborhood.
If an agent is in wealth class n in period t, what is his class in the next period?
Suppose agent the decides to live in the good neighborhood. Then with probability 1−π
the relative ranking of locations remains intact and the agent begins the next period with
the same possessions. With probability π the ranking is reversed, and the agent suﬀers
a capital loss. In the next period the agent has (n − 1) × p units of money in the bank
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Table 1: Wealth class in period t+ 1 depending on house location and housing arrange-
ment, when the initial wealth class is n
Good location Bad location
Owner-occupied
housing
n with probability 1− π
n− 1 with probability π
n with probability 1− π
n+ 1 with probability π
Rental housing n− 1 with probability 1 n+ 1 with probability 1
and a house in an undesirable neighborhood. Thus he has fallen one step down to wealth
class n− 1.
Next suppose the agent chooses the less desirable neighborhood, instead. With prob-
ability 1− π the neighborhood is unpopular also in the subsequent period, and the agent
stays in wealth class n. With probability π there is a change in fortunes, and the agent
makes a capital gain. With n×p units of money and a house in a desirable neighborhood,
the agent has succeeded in climbing to wealth class n+ 1.
Next we turn to rental housing. Assume the housing stock in both locations is managed
by a real estate company, owned by the agents. Let rg and rb denote per period level of
rents in the good and in the bad location, respectively. These steady state rents satisfy
the inequality rg > rb. In every period the total revenue collected by the real estate
company is rg + rb. This revenue is then distributed to the agents, with each of them
receiving (rg + rg)/2 units. Now the net change in an agent’s balances depends on where
he lives. Those residing in the desirable neighborhood pay r = (rg − rd)/2 units more
than they earn, while those choosing the less desirable location gain r units. The savings
of an agent then always constitute a multiple of r. Since the housing stock is in common
ownership, knowing an agent’s bank balance also tells his level of wealth. The transition
from one wealth class to another is simple. Those agents who choose the good location
always pay a net price r and fall one class down, while others who settle for the unpopular
neighborhood climb one ladder. In accordance to owner-occupation, we also assume that
there is a maximum amount of debt which cannot be exceeded. An agent reaching the
lowest allowed bank balance can only live in the less desirable neighborhood, no matter
what his type is.
The diﬀerences between owner-occupied and rental housing are summarized in Table
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1. Three points are worth emphasizing. First, in the rental arrangement, those who
want to live in the popular neighborhood always pay for the privilege, and likewise those
who stay in the less coveted location are duly compensated. In contrast, when houses are
owner-occupied, both payment and compensation take place only with probability π. This
distinction between random and non-random payments and revenues is the key insight of
the paper. In what follows we demonstrate that the closer link between costs and bene-
fits implies that rental housing does a better job in allocating agents in space and time.
Second, while the workings of the rental market are independent of the transition prob-
ability π, the market with owner-occupation is aﬀected by the length of the popularity
cycle. Finally, rental markets are equivalent to owner-occupation with deterministic cy-
cles: capital gains and losses which occur with certainty are indistinguishable from rental
costs and revenues. This fact considerably simplifies the subsequent analysis: instead of
analyzing two separate model variants, each corresponding to one housing arrangement,
we can simply construct a model of owner-occupation, and then study renting by setting
π equal to one.
4 The agent’s problem
Consider the optimization problem of any one agent. In every period he chooses his
location so as to maximize the expected discounted utility stream
Eθ
∞X
t=0
βtθλt,
where λt denotes an indicator function which is equal to one, if the agent lives in the
desirable location in period t, and zero otherwise. This is a stochastic dynamic control
problem in which the state variable is the level of wealth, that evolves according to the
law of motion
nt+1 = (1− st+1)nt + st+1 [(1− λt) (nt + 1) + λt (nt − 1)]
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where st is an indicator function which is equal to one if there is a regional shock and
zero otherwise. The liquidity constraint the agent faces is
λt = 0 if nt = 0
The problem can be conveniently presented in a recursive form. Let V (n) denote the
optimal value of the problem for an agent who has n units of wealth. V (n) satisfies the
Bellman equations
V (n) = Eθ [max {θ + β [(1− π)V (n) + πV (n− 1)] ,
β [(1− π)V (n) + πV (n+ 1)]}] for n ≥ 1 (3)
and
V (0) = β [(1− π)V (0) + πV (1)] (4)
Note that the value function V (n) is evaluated after the regional shock has been real-
ized but before the type θ has been revealed to the agent. The maximization problem
then defines the optimal choice of location that takes place when the value of θ becomes
known. Inside the maximum operator, the first expression is the value of living in the
desirable neighborhood, while the second expression is the value of choosing the less de-
sirable location. If the agent’s optimal decision is to live in the good neighborhood, he
can immediately ’eat’ whatever value θ realized. His prospects for the next period are
discounted by β and are given in the square brackets in the first argument of the maximiza-
tion problem. There is a probability 1−π that the location will be popular also tomorrow
so that he will be facing the same value function as today, while with probability π the
location loses its appeal and the agent suﬀers a capital loss. If the agent chooses the unde-
sirable neighborhood, his utility in the current period is zero. With probability (1−π) his
neighborhood is out of vogue also in the next period, while with probability π the ranking
of the locations is reversed, and the agent makes a capital gain. It is worth noting that
in the special case with π = 1 the recursion (3), (4) captures the agent’s maximization
13
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Figure 2: The θ∗n-curve when θ is uniformly distributed on [1, 2], β = .95 and π = .3
problem under rental markets. That is
V (n) = Eθ [max {θ + βV (n− 1), βV (n+ 1)}] for n ≥ 1
and
V (0) = βV (1)
Essentially, the maximization problem involves a trade-oﬀ between present benefits
and future options. The agent wants to avoid the situation where his choices are limited
by the liquidity constraint. Choosing the desirable location when the match is poor entails
the possibility that this option may not be available in the future when the match is better.
In each wealth class n ≥ 1 there is then a critical quality of match
θ∗n = πβ[V (n+ 1)− V (n− 1)] (5)
that equates the two arguments in the maximization operator in (3). Agents with θ > θ∗n
choose the desirable neighborhood, while those with θ < θ∗n go to the less desirable
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neighborhood in the hope of gaining an additional option. Finally, agents with θ = θ∗n are
indiﬀerent between the two alternatives; if the distribution G(θ) is continuous, this group
is always of measure zero. Figure 2 shows θ∗n with diﬀerent values of n when the earnings
are uniformly distributed on [1, 2], β = .95, and π = .3. Clearly, θ∗n decreases with n. This
is a general property of θ∗n, and it stems from the fact that the value function is concave.
Also this finding has a natural interpretation. If an agent has accumulated a large number
of options (or assets), an additional option is of less value. To put it diﬀerently, the more
assets the agent has, the more distant is the prospect of being liquidity constrained at
some point in the future. Thus, wealthy agents are willing to live in the popular location
even when their match is not so good. In particular, there is a level of wealth n < ∞
such that if n ≥ n, θ∗n < θL and the agent always chooses the desirable neighborhood6; in
Figure 2, n = 3.
The market outcome is clearly not socially optimal. In the optimal arrangement the
choice of location should depend on the current match only, so that the cut-oﬀ level would
be equal to θm for all agents; this is captured by the straight horizontal line that crosses
the vertical axis at 1.5 in Figure 2. In particular, agents at the two extreme ends of
the wealth ladder deviate radically from the optimal decision rule, as their location is
unaﬀected by the match.
Next we study what happens when the environment becomes more turbulent, or the
housing market arrangement is altered. For a numerical illustration, see also Figure 3.
Lemma 1 The θ∗n-schedule shifts up as π increases.
Proof See the appendix.
In other words, when costs and gains occur with a higher probability, a better match,
or a bigger wealth buﬀer, is needed before the agent chooses the popular location. This
is because transitions from one wealth class to another are likely to happen more often,
and the prospect of becoming liquidity constrained is an increasingly powerful deterrent.
6Assume by contrast that limn→∞ θ∗n = bθ ≥ θL > 0 and θ∗n ≥ bθ ∀n. Now as θ∗n is a non-increasing
sequence, which is bounded from below, we can conclude that for all k < ∞, limn→∞(θ∗n − θ∗n−k) = 0
and limn→∞
³R θH
θ∗n
θdG (θ)−
R θH
θ∗n−k
θdG (θ)
´
= 0. As a consequence limn→∞[V (n + 1) − V (n − 1)] = 0.
But then (5) implies that limn→∞ θ∗n = 0. A contradiction.
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Figure 3: The θ∗n-curve with diﬀerent values of π when θ is uniformly distributed on [1, 2]
and β = .95
This property already suggests why the rental arrangement fares better in our model than
owner-occupation. Under rental markets the agents are more likely to move voluntarily to
the less desirable neighborhood, when their match is poor. Then the mechanism allocation
people in space and time can rely predominantly on self-selection, rather than liquidity
constraints. However, to say something more precise about the eﬃciency of diﬀerent
housing arrangements, we need to know how the wealth distribution is determined. This
is the question we are going to address next.
5 Stationary wealth distribution
The agents’ optimal strategies depend on their wealth. Thus to proceed from the individ-
ual level to the aggregate level we need to know the stationary wealth distribution in the
economy. In particular, we want to study how the distribution reacts to changes in π.
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Denote by fn the size of wealth class n, and let
f bn = G (θ∗n) fn, f gn = (1−G (θ∗n)) fn
be the frequency of agents with wealth n who live in location i ∈ {b, g}. Notice also that
f bn
fgn
=
G(θ∗n)
1−G(θ∗n)
≡ γn (6)
The ’odds ratio’ γn decreases with n as wealthy agents are more likely to choose the good
neighborhood. It is also worth mentioning that γn > (<) 1 when θ∗n > (<) θm.
Now suppose that the ranking of the neighborhoods is reversed. Then all fn agents
who were previously in wealth class n either climb one step up or fall one step down,
depending on their house location. They are replaced by f bn−1 class n−1 agents who have
made a capital gain, and fgn+1 class n + 1 agents who have suﬀered a capital loss. The
distribution is stationary if and only if
fn ≡ f bn + f gn = f bn−1 + f
g
n+1 (7)
In addition to the stationarity condition (7), we also want to make sure that the housing
markets clear in both regions:
nX
n=0
f in = 1, i ∈ {b, g} (8)
To find the stationary distribution satisfying equations (7) and (8), consider the wealth
ladder in Figure 4. When the ranking of locations changes, the ladder is turned upside
down, as all agents who previously owned a house in a desirable neighborhood now find
that their possession is in less desirable location, and vice versa. This transition is captured
by the vertical arrows. Now, the wealth ladder remains unchanged if it is symmetric in
the sense that the two groups at the opposite ends of each step - i.e. the two groups with
17
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Figure 4: Wealth distribution
the same bank balance or money holdings - are of equal size:
f gn+1 = f bn (9)
The condition (9) also guarantees that there is an equal number of people in both regions,
and the demand for housing does not exceed supply in either region.
Now combining (6) and (9) allows us to write simple recursive equations for f in, i ∈
{b, g}
fgn+1 = γnfgn and f bn+1 = γn+1f bn (10)
and the frequency of any node can be linked to the size of the liquidity constrained group
f0
f bn = f
g
n+1 = f0
nY
i=0
γi n ≥ 0
where γ0 ≡
G(θH)
1−G(θH) . Finally, recall that in both neighborhoods the housing stock is equal
to unity so that we have the constraints (8). Then we get the formulae
f gn+1 = f bn =
Qn
i=0 γiPn−1
k=0
Qk
i=1 γi
for n = 0, ..., n− 1
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Figure 5: Wealth distributions with diﬀerent values of π when θ is uniformly distributed
on [1, 2] and β = .95
which, together with the equalities fn = f bn + fgn, determine the stationary distribution.
Figure 5 shows the stationary wealth distribution for three diﬀerent values of π, when
θ is uniformly distributed on [1, 2] and β = .95. The distributions are single-peaked, with
wealth classes in the middle typically having more mass than those on the tails. The
single-peakedness is a general property, and follows from the fact that γn is decreasing in
n. Intuitively, agents with less assets are likely to choose the less popular location and
make capital gains. For wealthy agents, capital losses are more probable. Thus transitions
in the wealth distribution tend to happen towards the middle.
We also notice that increasing π from .1 first to .3 and then to 1 shifts the distribution
to the right, towards higher wealth classes. When capital gains and losses become more
probable, the agents adopt increasingly cautious strategies, and are more likely to choose
the less desirable location, in the hope of capital gains. As a result a larger proportion of
the agents reach higher wealth levels. Notice also that with bigger values of π, there is less
mass on the tails of the distribution. This observation is worth mentioning since agents
in the extreme wealth classes are unwilling or unable to move in response to a changing
match.
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These findings can be restated more precisely, if we define the cumulative distribution
function
F (n;π) =
nX
i=0
fi.
Lemma 2 When π increases, the wealth distribution shifts to the right, in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance. That is ∂F (n;π)∂π ≤ 0. In particular, the size of the liquidity
constrained group decreases.
Proof By Lemma 1, the θ∗n-schedule shifts up when π grows. This then increases the
’odds ratio’ γn, and equations (10) imply that the ratio f in+1/f in, i ∈ {b, g} goes up. Thus
for each n, ∂(1−F (n;π))∂π ≥ 0 and
∂F (n;π)
∂π ≤ 0.
Finally we can characterize the money market equilibrium.
Remark 1 Assume that money is the only store of value, and denote the aggregate supply
of money by S. Then the money market equilibrium reads
p
nX
n=1
£
nf bn + (n− 1) fgn
¤
= S
It is easy to see that p, which measures both the price of housing in the desirable location
and the size of a capital loss (or gain), decreases in monetary terms, when π goes up.
As the rental arrangement corresponds to owner-occupation with π = 1, we can further
conclude that r ≤ p. Notice that if n = 1, money has no value.
6 Mobility and welfare
Now we are in the position to analyze social welfare and aggregate mobility under diﬀerent
housing arrangements. Take an agent belonging to wealth class n. In any period he
chooses the desirable neighborhood if his match θ ≥ θ∗n and otherwise goes to the less
desirable neighborhood. Given this strategy, the expected utility (before the draw of θ)
of the agent, or alternatively the average realized utility of all agents in class n, is
ωn = Pr(θ ≥ θ∗n)E[θ | θ ≥ θ∗n] =
Z θH
θ∗n
θdG(θ)
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In particular, ωn =
R θH
θL θdG(θ) if the agent is currently in the highest wealth class n, and
ω0 = 0 if he is liquidity constrained. Aggregation then involves summing over all wealth
classes, and the measure of overall welfare in any given period is
W =
nX
n=0
fnωn
An alternative way to approach social welfare is to imagine that an outsider enters
the economy. He is assigned to wealth class n with probability fn, and his expected
intertemporal prospects are then given by the value function V (n). The agent’s prospects
ex ante, i.e. before he knows his wealth, are
cW = nX
n=0
fnV (n) (11)
The appendix shows that, up to a constant multiplier, the two measures of welfare are
equivalent:
W = (1− β)cW (12)
Next consider mobility in the market outcome. Take any given wealth class n. In
the steady state, the portion 1−G(θ∗n) of agents with wealth level n live in the desirable
location. In any period the shareG(θ∗n) of the agents, who are in the popular neighborhood
at the beginning of the period, get a realization θ < θ∗n and move to the unpopular
neighborhood. Therefore, mobility from the desirable to the undesirable location in wealth
class n is equal to G(θ∗n)[1−G(θ∗n)]. Similarly, it is easy to see that the crosswise mobility,
i.e., from the undesirable to the desirable location, equals the same measure. Thus, overall
mobility in wealth class n is
µn = 2G(θ∗n)[1−G(θ∗n)].
Given G(θ∗n) ∈ [0, 1], we know that µn ∈ [0, 12 ]. The maximum value µn =
1
2
is attained
when θ∗n = θm, that is when the agents react to a changing match in the socially optimal
way. The more the threshold θ∗n diﬀers from the socially optimal median rule, the less
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Figure 6: Aggregate mobility and welfare as a function of π when θ is uniformly distributed
on [1, 2] and β = .95
migration there is. The intuition behind this finding is easy to grasp: Rich agents, with
high θ∗n, want to live in the popular neighborhood most of the time, and only rarely find it
optimal to change location. Likewise poor agents usually stay in the unpopular location;
for the liquidity constrained this is obviously the only alternative. Aggregate mobility
(M) can then be determined by calculating the weighted average over all wealth classes
M =
nX
n=0
fnµn
Figure 6 uses the uniform type distribution on [1, 2] as an example, and shows W
and M as a function of π, when β = .95. Measures of mobility and welfare can be
displayed in the same figure, since in the case of the uniform distribution, W is an aﬃne
transformation of M .7 With low values of π there is no mobility and M = 0. Half of the
7This is an artifact of the uniform distribution.
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agents are liquidity constrained, and welfare under pure rationing is WR = 1.5. When π
increases, self-selection gradually replaces the debt trap as the main mechanism allocating
people in space and time. As the agents face stronger incentives to choose their location
according to the current match, both aggregate mobility and social welfare increase. The
best possible outcome is achieved when π = 1, i.e. under the rental arrangement. However,
as there are always some liquidity constrained agents, the economy never reaches the fully
eﬃcient level of mobility M∗ = 1 and welfare W ∗ = 1.75.
The following two propositions establish that these properties hold more generally.
Proposition 1 An increase in π enhances aggregate mobility. As the rental arrangement
corresponds to the highest value of π, there is more mobility under rental housing than
under owner-occupation.
Proof See the appendix.
Proposition 2 An increase in π improves aggregate welfare. As the rental arrangement
corresponds to the highest possible value of π, rental markets outperform owner-occupation.
Proof The required derivations are more succinct and clear if some vector notation
is introduced. Let V, f and ω be column vectors capturing the value function, the ex-
pected utility per period, and the stationary wealth distribution, respectively. Totally
diﬀerentiating (11) yields
dcW
dπ =
df 0
dπ V + f
0dV
dπ =
df 0
dπ V + f
0∂V
∂π , (13)
where the second equality follows from the envelope theorem: as the threshold θ∗n is chosen
optimally in all wealth classes n ∈ {1, ..., n}, the indirect eﬀect on the value function can
be ignored. Next we use the identity (12) to show that also the direct eﬀect f 0 ∂V∂π vanishes:
f 0∂V∂π =
∂(f 0V )
∂π = (1− β)
−1∂(f 0ω)
∂π = 0
The first equality exploits the fact that the stationary distribution f depends on π only
indirectly, through the choice of policy and the second equality uses (12). The final
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equality follows from the observation that expected utility in a given period (ω) does not
depend directly on π.
Thus only the eﬀect through the stationary wealth distribution remains. By Lemma 2
we know that the distribution shifts to the right, towards higher wealth classes, when
π increases. As the value function V is increasing in n, this shift in the stationary
distribution translates into higher aggregate welfare cW :
dcW
dπ =
df 0
dπ V ≥ 0
7 Discussion
As a summary it may be instructive to reinterpret the model in slightly more abstract
terms. We considered an economy with a single indivisible good. In each period half of
the population is endowed with one unit of the commodity. The agents value the good
diﬀerently, and in every period their valuation θ is drawn independently from a stationary
distribution G (θ). There is also money in the economy, and as long as an agent’s money
holdings are non-negative, he can buy the good in the periods when his endowment is zero.
If the agent consumes the good in the current period he receives a positive endowment in
the subsequent period with probability 1−π. If the agent does not consume in the current
period, the probability of a positive endowment in the subsequent period is π. It is worth
noting that this intertemporal allocation rule punishes (rewards) current consumption if
π > (<) 1
2
. We then showed that the larger the value of π, the more likely it is that
the agents consume the good only when their valuation is high. In the housing market
context, π = 1 corresponds to rental markets, and under owner-occupation π < 1.
While we hope that our highly stylized framework may help in understanding certain
aspects of the housing market, we shall next discuss some of the simplifying assumptions,
and possible extensions.
(i) The paper compares two regimes, pure owner-occupation and a purely rental
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arrangement. We take the regime as given and do not derive it endogenously. Now
it might seem tempting to think that if the owner-occupied outcome is socially unopti-
mal, according to a utilitarian welfare criterion, a rental sector would emerge and correct
the situation. However, this is not necessarily the case. To see this, notice that each
housing arrangement generates a certain wealth distribution, and an agent’s willingness
to live in a good neighborhood depends on not only his type but also on his wealth.
Then an agent with a good match but little wealth might be unwilling (or unable) to
rent a house from an agent with a poorer match but more wealth. Obviously, liquidity
constrained agents would be altogether ruled out as potential tenants. Notice that utility
derived from living in a desirable location is unalienable, and the aspirant tenant cannot
transfer a part of his utility premium θ to a (potential) landlord as a payment. To put
it in more general term, there are no mutually beneficial trades within a period. (In this
sense our pure endowment-consumption model diﬀers from a production economy, where
θ measures productivity.)
(ii) Money is the only store of value in our model. If π ∈ (0, 1), assets bearing a positive
interest rate are not consistent with a stochastic steady state in the pure consumption
model. To see this assume that there are such assets, and the agents can save as much as
they wish as well as borrow up to a certain limit −b, where −∞ < −b < 0. For markets
to clear some agents should have negative asset holdings. Suppose that an agent owning
a house in the bad neighborhood holds negative assets. With a positive probability,
the agent never makes a capital gain and, as a result of interest payments, his wealth
falls below −b. Suppose next that an agent owning a house in the currently popular
neighborhood has a negative balance. With a positive probability the agent suﬀers a
capital loss (and makes no subsequent capital gains), and his debt exceeds −b.
(iii) While our pure consumption model may be suitable for analyzing certain aspects
of housing markets within a city or a region, a labor market based approach is probably
more appropriate when analyzing interregional mobility. In a companion paper (Haavio
and Kauppi (2003)), we study a production economy, where θ measures an agent’s pro-
ductivity in a booming region, and the regional shocks, taking place with probability π,
are interpreted as alterations in regional labor market conditions, or regional business
25
cycles. In this economy the agents choose both where they want to live and work and
how much to consume and save (in terms of an interest bearing asset). Although the
mechanisms at work are somewhat diﬀerent, the main findings of this paper by and large
carry over to the interregional labor market context. Most notably, we establish in Haavio
and Kauppi (2003) that the owner-occupied housing market tends to work better, when
regional business cycles are frequent (π is large). This is because capital losses are rather
small, and it is relatively easy for the agents to protect themselves through precautionary
saving, and thereby to avoid being borrowing constrained. In the labor market model the
rental arrangement is actually socially optimal.8
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
In this appendix we show that the θ∗n-schedule shifts up when π increases. To derive
this result, first notice that an agent’s strategy, telling how he chooses his location in
each wealth class, essentially involves finding an optimal threshold value θ∗n for each
n ≥ 1. Given this reinterpretation of the problem, and using matrix notation, the Bellman
equations (3) can be reexpressed in the following form
V = max
{θ∗n}
ω + β [(1− π) I + πP ]V (14)
for n ≥ 1 (and θ0 = θH) where V is the value function, stacked as a column vector, ω is
the column vector of expected immediate utility, with elements
ωn (θ∗n) ≡
Z θH
θ∗n
θdG(θ)
8As labor income (unlike utility) can be used for rental payments, the criticism raised in item (i) is more
potent in the production economy: if given a chance, a borrowing constrained agent with a good current
match would rent a house in the booming region. To address this criticism, some additional distortions,
emanating from e.g. agency costs or taxation must be introduced to the rental sector. These distortions
are implicitly present in the analysis of the owner-occupied regime in Haavio and Kauppi (2003), while
Haavio (2003) studies them explicitly, together with credit market imperfections, in a model where the
housing market arrangement is derived endogenously.
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and P is a transition matrix, with elements
Pi,j =



1−G(θ∗i ) if j = i− 1
G(θ∗i ) if j = i+ 1
0 otherwise
i, j ∈ {0, ..., n}
The second step involves analyzing how the value function changes when π is increased.
Diﬀerentiating the Bellman equation (14) with respect to π, and using the envelope the-
orem, yields
dV
dπ =
∂V
∂π =
δ
π (I − δP )
−1(P − I)V (15)
where
δ ≡ πβ
1− β (1− π) , δ ∈ [0, 1)
is the uncertainty adjusted discount rate.
Finally, we turn to studying the first order conditions (5). They can be rephrased
using matrix notation
θ∗ = πβDV (16)
where θ∗ = (θ∗1, ..., θ∗n)0 is the vector of threshold values9 and D is the diﬀerence matrix,
with elements
Di,j =



1 if j = i+ 1
−1 if j = i− 1
0 otherwise
i ∈ {1, ..., n}, j ∈ {0, ..., n}
To see how the threshold values θ∗ change when π increases, we have to totally diﬀerentiate
the first order conditions (16). We start by the right hand side:
d (πβDV )
dπ = βDV + βπD
∂V
∂π = βD[I + δ(I − δP )
−1(P − I)]V
= β(1− δ)D(I − δP )−1V > 0 (17)
9Notice that θ∗0 cannot be freely chosen, as the agents are liquidity constrained.
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When deriving the second equality of (17), the result (15) was needed. In signing the
expression we have used the following facts: (i) The value function V is increasing n.
(ii) Then also (I − δP )−1V =
P∞
i=0(δP )iV is increasing in n. To see this, notice that
(1 − δP )−1V is the value of a Markov process, with transition matrix P and immediate
gain in state n given by V (n). As this immediate gain increases with n, the expected
present value of the program also increases. (iii) When we premultiply an increasing
vector by the diﬀerence matrix D, the result is positive.
Now we can get the desired result:
dθ∗
dπ = β(1− δ)D(I − δP )
−1V > 0
In words, when the probability of capital gains and losses increases, the θ∗n -schedule shifts
upwards. As the case with π = 1 corresponds to rental markets, we can further conclude
that an agent with a given wealth level is more inclined to choose the depressed city when
houses are rented than when they are owned.
Proof of Proposition 1
Given the housing market equilibrium (8), the measure of aggregate mobility M can be
reexpressed as follows
M = f 0κ− 1
where κ is a (n+ 1)× 1 vector with a generic element
κn ≡
Z θH
θ∗n
G (θ) dG (θ) = 1− [G (θ∗n)]
2
Next we define a quasi value function Q, which satisfies the recursive equation
Q = κ+ ηPQ (18)
⇔ Q = (I − ηP )−1 κ =
∞X
i=0
(ηP )i κ (19)
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where η ∈ (0, 1). Notice that Q is the value of a program with immediate payoﬀ κ,
transition matrix P and discount factor η. Now, as f 0P = f 0, M can be further rewritten
as
M = (1− η) f 0Q− 1 (20)
Then diﬀerentiating M with respect to π yields
dM
dπ = (1− η)
·
df 0
dθ∗Q+ f
0 dQ
dθ∗
¸
dθ∗
dπ (21)
The expression (21) consists of three terms df
0
dθ∗Q, f 0
dQ
dθ∗and
dθ∗
dπ . Next we show that all
three terms are non-negative.
(i) As the immediate gain κn is increasing in n, also the the quasi value function is
increasing. By Lemma 2 rising threshold values θ∗ shift the wealth distribution f to the
right, toward higher values of n. But then df 0dθ∗Q ≥ 0.
(ii) Totally diﬀerentiating (18) with respect to θ∗n gives
dQ
dθ∗n
= (1− ηP )−1 {−G (θ∗n) + η [Q (n+ 1)−Q (n− 1)]}dG (θ∗n)
Next notice that the equation (20) holds for any η ∈ (0, 1), and thus the discount factor
η can be freely chosen. When η approaches unity, the quasi value function Q explodes,
and from equation (19) we get
lim
η→1
η [Q (n+ 1)−Q (n− 1)] =∞
and thus choosing η close enough to 1 yields dQdθ∗n ≥ 0.
10 As the same argument applies for
all n, dQdθ∗ ≥ 0, for η close enough to 1. Then it follows immediately that f 0
dQ
dθ∗ ≥ 0.
(iii) By Lemma 1, dθ
∗
dπ > 0.
Combining steps (i), (ii) and (iii) gives dMdπ ≥ 0.
10Notice that dQdθ∗N
= 0 if dG (θ∗n) = 0.
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Aggregate welfare: The derivation of equation (12)
In this appendix we derive the equation (12).
First, with a given moving policy θ∗, the Bellman equations (14) can be reexpressed
using matrix algebra, and the notation introduced in the previous section:
V = (1− δ) ω
1− β + δPV (22)
Now solving (22) for ω we get
ω = 1− β
1− δ (I − δP )V (23)
On the other hand the stationary distribution f can be solved from the equation
f 0(I − P ) = 0⇔ (I − P 0)f = 0 (24)
which determines f as the eigenvector associated to the unit eigenvalue of P 0 (See e.g.
Ljungquist and Sargent (2000, p. 3)). With these preliminaries, we can now derive the
equation (12):
W = f 0ω = f 01− β
1− δ (I − δP )V =
1− β
1− δ f
0(I − P + (1− δ)P )V
= (1− β)f 0PV = (1− β)f 0V = (1− β)cW
The second equality follows from (23), elementary manipulations lead to the third equality,
the fourth and the fifth equality then use (24).
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